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ROADBLOCKS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND FEDERAL
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

When the energy law practitioner has pursued, but failed to achieve,
an appropriate remedy through the Department of Energy (DOE) or the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the practicioner must
decide whether to seek judicial review. Although the nature of the administrative action, the relief sought, and the client's propensity to litigate are important factors in making such an assessment, the primordial
factor is whether judicial review is available at all. If the practitioner
determines that the availability of judicial review does not exist with respect to his client, his assessment ends ab initio.
Obtaining judicial review of any administrative action is a complex
undertaking, and review within the energy law context has proven no
different. Legal obstacles abound. However, these obstacles, which are
essentially legal questions peculiar to the regime of administrative law,
are surmountable. For the purpose of analysis, these legal questions may
be categorized as follows, each of which is a requisite to relief beyond the
administrative process:
I. Determining that judicial review is not precluded by statute;
II. Determining the court with proper jurisdiction to hear the
dispute;
III. Ensuring that the doctrines of finality, ripeness, and exhaustion of remedies have been satisfied;
IV. Ascertaining the availability of relief pending review;
V. Standing of the client to seek review;
VI. Determining the scope of review.
In order to aid the energy law practitioner, this comment makes an
analysis of these legal questions within the context of energy law decisions, with occasional reference to non-energy law decisions of major
importance.
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PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides for judicial re-

view of administrative actions.1 On its face the APA appears to allow a
court to review any agency action which results in a person being "ad-

versely affected" or "aggrieved." However, the APA is limited in very
substantial ways.
The last sentence of section 702 states:
Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the
power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any
other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to
grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or
impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.2
In effect, this latter qualification means that section 702 of the APA,

while expressing strong public interest in avoiding even the appearance of
possible abuses of administrative power,3 and creating a presumption of

the right to judicial review,' is no more than a "restatement of the existing law" regarding judicial review of agency action' and does not confer jurisdiction on a court not already possessing it.6 Further, the most

noted self-imposed restriction of judicial review under the APA comes
from section 701, which states in pertinent part: "(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that-(1)
statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law."' 7 Therefore, if a statute precludes judicial review of a particular action taken by the Department of Energy or the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or if that action is "committed
by law" 8 to agency discretion, then judicial review is unavailable.
1. "A person suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial relief
thereof." Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982)) [hereinafter "APA"].
2. Id. § 702.
3. North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 386 F. Supp. 665, 678 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
4. See, eg., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Rochester v. Bond, 603
F.2d 927, 931 n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Department of Income Maintenance v. Schweiker, 557 F.
Supp. 1077, 1079 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd, 471 U.S. 524 (1985); National Corn Growers Ass'n v.
Berglund, 471 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (S.D. Iowa 1979), vacated in part,484 F. Supp. 1342 (S.D. Iowa
1980).
5. Hamel v. Nelson, 226 F. Supp. 96, 97 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
6. American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1984); Hadley Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker, 689 F.2d 905,
911 (10th Cir. 1982); Boyce v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)(2) (1982).
8. Id. § 702.
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Statutory Preclusion
Statutory preclusion need not be express. Preclusion may be im-

plied by the language contained in the agency's organic statute or in the
legislative history of the statute. 9
The DOE's organic statute was the DOE Organization Act of
1977.10 This Act consolidated various federal energy responsibilities into
a new cabinet-level Department of Energy and an independent Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission.1 1 Responsibilities of the new department came from a general transfer of the functions of the Federal Energy
Administration, the Federal Energy Research and Development Administration, and the Federal Power Commission.12 Transfers from non-

energy agencies included various functions of the Department of the Interior,1 3 the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 14 the Interstate Commerce Commission,15 the Department of the Navy,16 and
the Commerce Department. 7
Preclusion under the "statutory preclusion" exception to the availa-

bility of judicial review does not seem to be an obstacle to judicial review
of DOE and FERC actions. The legislative history of the DOE Organi-

zation Act provides expressly for judicial review through "Title V- Administrative Procedures and Judicial Review." 18 The Senate Report
9. Chicago & S. Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Switchmen's
Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943); Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. FTC, 515 F.2d
367, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 7131 (1982) (originally enacted as Pub. L. 95-91, Aug. 4, 1977, 91 Stat. 565,
amended as Department of Energy Act).
11. Originally, an independent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission was not contemplated
by the drafters of this act, but politically strange bedfellows were responsible for an amendment
which set up FERC as an independent regulatory agency. Professor Byse descibes the process leading to the enactment of the amendment relating to FERC as follows:
But a not so funny thing happened to this part of the bill on its way through the House.
Representative John E. Moss, a liberal Democrat and an advocate of strict price control of
wellhead prices, and Representative Clarence J. Brown, a conservative Republican and an
advocate of deregulation, proposed an amendment to establish an independent five-member
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission within the Department of Energy and to transfer
to the Commission all FPC regulatory powers, except a limited category which were specifically listed and transferred to the Secretary. Messrs. Moss and Brown stressed their unwillingness to give any cabinet officer power to fix the wellhead price of natural gas ....
Byse, The Dept of Energy OrganizationAct: Structure and Procedure,30 ADMIN. LAW
REV. 193, 199 (1978) (footnote omitted).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7151 (1982).
13. Id. § 7152.
14. Id. § 7154.

15. Id.§ 7155.
16. Id. § 7156.
17. Id. § 7157.
18. S.REP. No. 164, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
854, 897-900.
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within the legislative history states: "Sec. 501(F) provides for judicial review of an agency action." 19 The Senate Report neither mentions the
underlying policies of section 501(F) (now 42 U.S.C. § 7192) nor contains language that any particular DOE agency action is statutorily prohibited.2 ° "Neither the Conference Report nor the statements and
colloquies made on the floor contain more than oblique references to the
availability of judicial review [of DOE agency actions] ....
,21
To make a final determination of the availability of judicial review
one must ultimately look to the language of section 7192 of the DOE
Organization Act itself and disregard the superficial inferences in the legislative history. Section 7192(a) states:
Judicial review of agency action taken under any law the functions of
which are vested by law in, or transferred or delegated to the Secretary
[of the Energy Department], the [Federal Energy Regulatory] Commission or any officer, employee, or component of the Department
shall, notwithstanding such vesting, transfer, or delegation, be made in
the manner specified in or for such law.22
Thus, because DOE and FERC were created by the consolidation of
functions of various agencies, statutory preclusion must be determined
by a derivative analysis of DOE and FERC actions under the prior authority of a particular transferor agency. This means that in determining
whether review is statutorily precluded, either by express language or by
implication, one must look at the particular DOE or FERC action in
question and then determine from which source the authority for the
action originally came. 23 Then one must look to that source's legislative
language and history to determine whether review is precluded.2 4
An illustrative case is Atlantic Richfield Co. v. DOE.25 In this case
19. Id at 899.
20. IM.899-900.
21. Gulf Oil Corp. v. DOE, 663 F.2d 296, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted) (ruling that

finality of agency action is not necessary for judicial intervention based on legislative intent).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7192(a) (1982).
23. E.g., HUD under 42 U.S.C. § 7154 (1982).

24. Professor Byse indicates that "[t]here is a measure of untidiness in this provision, for it
means that judicial review of the actions of the Secretary and the Commissioner will be governed by
a number of different statutory provisions distributed throughout the United States Code." Byse
supra note 10, at 223.
25. 500 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 665 F.2d 1118 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981). See
also, Montana Power Co. v. Edwards, 531 F. Supp. 8 (D. Or. 1981). The Montana Power Co.
brought a declaratory action against the Secretary of Energy seeking a ruling that the Secretary had
no authority to approve the Bonneville Power Admin. rate schedules on an interim basis. The Secre-

tary acted under 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b) (1982) which provides: "Except as provided in title IV of this
chapter, there are transfered to, and vested in, the Secretary [of Energy] the functions of the Federal
Power Commission, or of the members, officers, or components thereof.

. ."

The court obtained jurisdiction to review this action under 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) (a section of
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the plaintiffs, all large integrated oil companies,2 6 brought an action

against DOE alleging that regulatory amendments made by DOE to its
crude oil "Entitlements Program"2 7 were beyond the scope of DOE's

regulatory authority. The Secretary of the Department of Energy had

acted under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) 28 to alleviate the distortion in prices between "old" oil, which was subject to
mandatory price controls, and "new" oil, which could be sold at market
levels.2 9 The Entitlements Program attempted to correct price distortion
by allocating a portion of the economic advantage enjoyed by those who
had access to "old" oil to those who did not have access to "old" oil."0
In concluding that DOE had not exceeded its authority under EPAA,
the court had to look at cases construing the EPAA under the authority
of the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), a predecessor agency to
DOE.3 1 The court also looked to the legislative history of the EPAA.3 2
This case shows the derivative analysis that a court must make in determining the scope and availability of judicial review of DOE actions.
B.

Committed to Agency Discretion

The APA specifically excludes from judicial review agency action
that is committed by law to agency discretion. 3 However, the courts,
realizing the strong presumption favoring judicial review,3 4 place the
burden of proof as to non-reviewability on the agency. Courts have
the APA) governing the availability of judicial review of this type of Federal Power Comm. (FPC)
action prior to the Dep't of Energy (DOE) Organization Act. The court held that the legislative
histories of the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act (which gave the FPC authority to set
Bonneville Power Admin. rate schedules) do not suggest that Congress intended to curb the FPC's
authority to grant the interim approval of rates. The Secretary of Energy "inherited" this power with
the passage of the DOE Organization Act. Montana Power Co., 531 F. Supp. at 10.
26. Atlantic Richfield Co., 500 F. Supp. at 1303. The plaintiffs were Atlantic Richfield Co.,
Marathon Oil Co., Mobil Oil Co., and Texaco, Inc.
27. 10 C.F.R. § 211.69 (1986).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760 (1982).
29. Atlantic Richfield Co., 500 F. Supp. at 1303.
30. Id. at 1304. The "entitlements" amounted to a paper transfer of the right to refine the
cheaper "old" oil. The refiner was entitled to one "entitlement" for each barrel of cheap oil it
refined. If a refiner used more than the minimum amount of "entitlements" it had to make up the
difference by buying "entitlements" from other refiners, primarily those using "new" oil. The price
of the entitlement was established by the DOE to reflect the disparity of prices between "old" and
"new" oil.
31. Id. at 1305.
32. Id. at 1306.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982).
34. See supra note 4.
35. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC., 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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stated that this exception to judicial review is a narrow one36 which may
be invoked only upon a clear and convincing showing that precluding
review would further the intent of Congress.3 7 This exception applies in
those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that
there is no law to apply.38 Even in those cases where an administrative
agency has a special expertise, the court has not entirely precluded judicial review based on agency discretion.3 9 When the courts so narrowly
interpret this preclusionary exception to judicial review and when a provision within the APA itself denies the preclusion where there is an abuse
of discretion,' it seems to be a futile effort for an agency to attempt to
invoke this exception.
Even though the test is a narrow one, an analysis of energy-related
decisions indicates that courts have not been reluctant to defer to agency
discretion declaring that the narrow test has been met. One example is
Cerro Wire and Cable Co. v. FERC.4 1 In Cerro the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that the FERC's decision to hold an informal conference instead of an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of
agency discretion. 2 The complaint was lodged by various commercial
and industrial users of natural gas regarding alleged violations of the
abandonment of service provision of the Natural Gas Act43 by an interstate pipeline company.' The court stated that FERC need not hold an
45
evidentiary hearing where there was no material issue of fact.
46
Another example is the case of Illinois Cities of Bethany v. FERC.
In that case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
the FERC's refusal to normalize4 7 an increase in the generating plant
capacity of a public utility was neither an arbitrary nor capricious abuse
36. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
37. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 501 (1977).

38. Ashton v. Pierce, 541 F. Supp. 635, 643 (D.C. 1982), (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)).
39. Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973). "Proper application of [the
determination of whether an alien will be a productive citizen] undoubtedly depends on the expertise
of the Secretary of Labor. But that does not insulate his decision from judicial review." Id. at 889.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
41. 677 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
42. Id. at 129. See also Public Service Co. v. FERC, 600 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 990 (1979); Union Mechling Corp. v. United States, 566 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Citizens for
Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 717(f)(b) (1982).
44. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. (Transco).
45. Cerro Wire, 677 F.2d at 128.
46. 670 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
47. The court defined "normalize" in this case, determining that it meant to exclude from the

rate base of a public utility all costs associated with reserve capacity in excess of 15%. Id. at 200-01.
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levels.2 9 The Entitlements Program attempted to correct price distortion
by allocating a portion of the economic advantage enjoyed by those who
had access to "old" oil to those who did not have access to "old" oil."0
In concluding that DOE had not exceeded its authority under EPAA,
the court had to look at cases construing the EPAA under the authority
of the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), a predecessor agency to
DOE." The court also looked to the legislative history of the EPAA.3 2
This case shows the derivative analysis that a court must make in determining the scope and availability of judicial review of DOE actions.
B.

Committed to Agency Discretion

The APA specifically excludes from judicial review agency action
that is committed by law to agency discretion. 3 However, the courts,
realizing the strong presumption favoring judicial review,3 4 place the
burden of proof as to non-reviewability on the agency. Courts have
the APA) governing the availability of judicial review of this type of Federal Power Comm. (FPC)
action prior to the Dep't of Energy (DOE) Organization Act. The court held that the legislative
histories of the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act (which gave the FPC authority to set
Bonneville Power Admin. rate schedules) do not suggest that Congress intended to curb the FPC's
authority to grant the interim approval of rates. The Secretary of Energy "inherited" this power with
the passage of the DOE Organization Act. Montana Power Co., 531 F. Supp. at 10.
26. Atlantic Richfield Co., 500 F. Supp. at 1303. The plaintiffs were Atlantic Richfield Co.,
Marathon Oil Co., Mobil Oil Co., and Texaco, Inc.
27. 10 C.F.R. § 211.69 (1986).
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30. Id. at 1304. The "entitlements" amounted to a paper transfer of the right to refine the
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35. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC., 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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stated that this exception to judicial review is a narrow one 36 which may
be invoked only upon a clear and convincing showing that precluding
review would further the intent of Congress. 37 This exception applies in
those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that
there is no law to apply.38 Even in those cases where an administrative
agency has a special expertise, the court has not entirely precluded judicial review based on agency discretion.3 9 When the courts so narrowly
interpret this preclusionary exception to judicial review and when a provision within the APA itself denies the preclusion where there is an abuse
of discretion,' it seems to be a futile effort for an agency to attempt to
invoke this exception.
Even though the test is a narrow one, an analysis of energy-related
decisions indicates that courts have not been reluctant to defer to agency
discretion declaring that the narrow test has been met. One example is
Cerro Wire and Cable Co. v. FERC.4 1 In Cerro the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that the FERC's decision to hold an informal conference instead of an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of
agency discretion.4 2 The complaint was lodged by various commercial
and industrial users of natural gas regarding alleged violations of the
abandonment of service provision of the Natural Gas Act 4 3 by an interstate pipeline company." The court stated that FERC need not hold an
evidentiary hearing where there was no material issue of fact.4 5
46
Another example is the case of Illinois Cities of Bethany v. FERC.
In that case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
the FERC's refusal to normalize4 7 an increase in the generating plant
capacity of a public utility was neither an arbitrary nor capricious abuse
36. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
37. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 501 (1977).
38. Ashton v. Pierce, 541 F. Supp. 635, 643 (D.C. 1982), (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)).
39. Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973). "Proper application of [the
determination of whether an alien will be a productive citizen] undoubtedly depends on the expertise
of the Secretary of Labor. But that does not insulate his decision from judicial review." Id. at 889.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
41. 677 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
42. Id. at 129. See also Public Service Co. v. FERC, 600 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444

U.S. 990 (1979); Union Mechling Corp. v. United States, 566 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Citizens for
Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

43. 15 U.S.C. § 717(f)(b) (1982).
44. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. (Transco).
45. Cerro Wire, 677 F.2d at 128.
46. 670 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
47. The court defined "normalize" in this case, determining that it meant to exclude from the
rate base of a public utility all costs associated with reserve capacity in excess of 15%. Id. at 200-01.
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of discretion4 8 under the Federal Power Act.49 Various municipalities
sought direct review of a FERC order approving a wholesale electric
power tariff filed by an electric utility.50 The court stated that the FERC
is permitted to adjust retail rates within a range of reasonableness to
respond either to utility efforts to depress retail rates to meet competition
or to situations where imperfections of regulation result in an unintended
price squeeze.51 Even though the municipalities alleged a price
squeeze,52 the court allowed the agency discretion to raise the tariff that
the municipalities would have to pay to the public utility wholesaler
when there was no concurrent increase in the rate that the municipalities
could charge the individual consumer.
The leading case respecting FERC's action as committed to agency
discretion is GeneralMotors Corp. v. FERC.53 In that case the petitioner,
General Motors, sought to set aside a FERC order which dismissed General Motor's complaint against a curtailment plan filed with FERC by
the Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America (Pipeline).5 4 Because of
natural gas shortages, Pipeline filed a proposal with FERC to curtail gas
deliveries. Pipeline also fied an accompanying scheme to allocate deliveries between customers. 55 The allocation scheme allowed Pipeline's
small users to increase their entitlements to output up to previous contractual limits, while Pipeline's large customers would not be allowed to
increase entitlements and would be forced into pro rata curtailments
should shortages occur. 6
A subsequent FERC order5 7 set out priorities of allocation during
periods of curtailment and specified that the natural gas' "end use"
would be the basis of allocation. This order provided the springboard for
General Motors' complaint.58 General Motors alleged that FERC's approval of Pipeline's allocation scheme violated section 5(a) of the Natural
48. Id. at 201.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (1982).
50. Illinois Cities of Bethany, 670 F.2d at 187.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 194.
53. 613 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1979). This opinion refers to all actions as "FERC" actions. The
author, in his discussion of this case, follows a like practice, but wishes to remind the reader that
FERC was not created until 1977 and all actions prior to 1977 are technically FPC actions.
54. Iae at 941.
55. I1d

56. Id. at 942.
57. Order 467, 49 F.P.C. 85 (1973), amended 49 F.P.C. 583 (1973), amended 51 F.P.C. 1199

(1974).
58. General Motors, 613 F.2d at 943.
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Gas Act5 9 because, inter alia, it was not based on the "end use" standard
required in the subsequent FERC order. 0

FERC dismissed the complaint stating that a particular curtailment
plan was not a per se violation of section 5(a) even though it was not
based on "end use." FERC further stated that General Motors had
failed to show proximate cause between Pipeline's curtailment plan and

General Motors' alleged injury. 61 FERC granted General Motors rehearing on the basis that a formal hearing was necessary to investigate
Pipeline's alleged shortages, and to determine whether the curtailment

plan was subject to an "end use" test. After rehearing, FERC again dismissed General Motors complaint stating that General Motors had again
failed to show proximate cause and that FERC's order referring to "end
use" was never intended to apply to every pipeline system because mar6
ket deterrents could effectively preclude imposition of the order. 1

General Motors then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia alleging that FERC's two dismissals were an abuse of
discretion and were arbitrary and capricious. 63 The Court of Appeals disagreed stating that an administrative agency's decision to conduct or not
to conduct an investigation" is a matter committed to agency discretion 6 5 After stating that General Motors had not contended that FERC
had ignored any relevant factor in its decision to dismiss and the reasons

therefore, the court said: "If an agency considers all the relevant factors
so that a court can satisfy itself that the agency has actually exercised its
59. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1982). This statute states:
(a) Necessity of regulation in public interest. As disclosed in reports of the Federal Trade
Commission made pursuant to S. Res. 83 (Seventieth Congress, first session) and other
reports made pursuant to the authority of Congress, it is declared that the business of
transporting and selling natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a
public interest,and that Federal regulation in matters relating to the transportation of natural gas and the sale thereof in interstate and foreign commerce is necessary in the public
interest. Id. (emphasis added).
The basis of General Motor's reasoning was that it was in fact an ultimate consumer within the
language of the statute, and FERC, by virtue of what General Motors viewed as a violation of its
own order (Order 467, supra note 56) did not act in the "public interest."
60. Order 467, supra note 57.
61. GeneralMotors, 613 F.2d at 944.
62. Id
63. Id
64. Apparently, General Motors believed that a formal hearing, which it requested on meeting
with FERC, is tantamount to an "investigation." It is possible, however, for an agency to conduct
informal hearings which include investigations into such things as Pipeline's alleged shortages of
natural gas. General Motor's request, on rehearing, that FERC explain why a formal hearing was
not necessary to investigate Pipeline's alleged shortages is evidence of General Motor's apparent
inability to detach the necessity of an investigation from the necessity of a formal hearing. Id.
65. Id.
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discretion, an agency's decision to refrain from investigation is unreview-

able." 6 6 But a concurring opinion reiterated the idea that, absent a clear
intent to the contrary, agency action is presumptively reviewable67 and
that, notwithstanding the court's decision, the unreviewability of agency
action committed to agency discretion is constrained by various other
factors.68
III.

PRIMARY AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AND METHODS OF
OBTAINING AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY

If judicial review of agency action is not precluded, the next step is
to determine which court has the proper jurisdiction to decide the controversy. In seeking review of DOE or FERC action 69 the first place
to look is the DOE Organization Act. 0 If a statute that provides for
judicial review of agency action is deemed to be exclusive, the APA cannot contravene it71 even though the statute does not expressly indicate
exclusivity.

72

The DOE Organization Act provides a starting point for determining jurisdiction. The derivative nature of DOE and FERC creation
makes the question of jurisdiction easier for those familiar with the derivative acts. Section 7192(a), provides:
Agency Action. Judicial review of agency action taken under any law

the functions of which are vested by law in, or transferred or delegated
to the Secretary, the Commission or any officer, employee, or compo-

nent of the Department shall, notwithstanding such vesting, transfer,
66. Id.
67. Id. at 946 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
68. Factors mentioned in Judge Bazelon's concurrence allow review of discretionary agency
action, including situations where:
1. the agency relies on legal rather than mere factual grounds;
2. the aggrieved party claims arbitrariness;
3. there is no other adequate remedy in court for a challenge to final agency action.
Id. (citations omitted).
But see City of Bedford v. FERC, 718 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (where the court held that
even though investigations bearing upon statutory entitlements are exceptions to the general proposition that investigation priorities are matters committed to agency discretion, the court must nevertheless accord the agency's judgment great weight).
69. In passing the DOE Organization Act Congress created a separate DOE and FERC but no
separate provisions for review. Review of either DOE or FERC actions arises under 42 U.S.C.
§ 7192 (1982).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 7131 (1982).
71. Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973). The court in Getty stated: "If Congress specifically designates a forum for judicial review or
administrative action, such a forum is exclusive, and this result does not depend on the use of the
word 'exclusive' in the statute providing for a forum for judicial review." Id. at 356.
72. Id.
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73
or delegation, be made in the manner specified in or for such law.
As in the question of preclusion, the source of agency power will
determine which court has jurisdiction. For example, jurisdiction of a
DOE action which was previously the responsibility of the Federal Energy Administration is in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia when DOE rules in areas of general and national
applicability. But when DOE rules in areas of general but less than national applicability, jurisdiction is in the Court of Appeals of the circuit
where the rule has its greatest impact.74
The second paragraph of section 7192(b) of the DOE Organization
Act which allows judicial review is residual.7" It gives United States District Courts exclusive jurisdiction of all agency actions not covered by
section 7192(a). The only exception is that state courts have jurisdiction
over state actions enforcing rules or orders made by state officials under
the Act that involve non-constitutional questions.7 6
A particular factual situation may lead to review in different courts,
depending on the interpretation given to those facts. In Texaco, Inc. v.
DOE 77 the issue was whether the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA) had jurisdiction over FERC inaction or omission in refusing to review a DOE interim order.78 A federal district court concluded
that FERC had such reviewing authority and remanded to FERC for
review. Not wanting to be forced into reviewing its own decision, FERC
appealed to TECA. 79 TECA dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, stating that an omission is an "agency action" that did not have a
derivative source and is thus exclusively governed by the DOE Organization Act.8 0 The district court, under 42 U.S.C. § 7192(b), retained jurisdiction because its decision was not yet appealable, the merits not yet
having been decided.8 1 In other words, the district court, not TECA,
had original jurisdiction.82 If TECA had determined that FERC's omis-

73. 42 U.S.C. § 7192(a) (1982).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 766(c) (1982). This occurs because the Federal Energy Administrative Act,

which predated the DOE Organization Act from which the latter derives its jurisdiction in actions
previously committed to the FEA, so provides.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 7192(b) (1982).
76. IL
77. 616 F.2d 1193 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979).

78. Id. at 1195.
79. Id. at 1194.
80. Id. at 1196.
81. Id.
82. TECA stated:
Whether FERC must entertain an appeal from a grant as well as a denial of adjustment
relief thus involves an interpretation of the DOE Act itself and not an application of any
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sion did not arise under the DOE Organization Act, but instead under
the Emergency Petroleum Act as FERC argued, section 7192(a) would
have applied. If that had been the case, the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act would have granted TECA jurisdiction.
Whether the APA could be an independent source of jurisdiction
where a statute did not otherwise provide has been the subject of divergent conclusions among the legal profession. Professors Byse and Fiocca
have determined that the APA confers jurisdiction,8 3 while Professor
Cramton determined that the APA cannot confer jurisdiction. 84 In
Califano v. Sanders8" the Supreme Court acknowledged the confusion
and held that since Congress amended8 6 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), federal
question jurisdiction, to eliminate the need for any dollar amount to be in
controversy, the APA could not be read to confer jurisdiction. That
opinion rendered moot the question of whether the APA confers jurisdiction. The Court stated:
The obvious effect of this modification, subject only to preclusion-ofreview statutes created or retained by Congress, is to confer jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action, regardless of whether
the APA of its own force may serve as a jurisdictional predicate. We
conclude that this amendment [to 28 U.S.C. 1331(a)] now largely undercuts the rationale for interpreting the APA as an independent jurisdictional provision. 8
This statement is logical in light of the APA structure itself. While
not seeming to require an independent source of jurisdiction, the APA
does not state that it confers independent jurisdiction. In fact, the APA
seems to go out of its way to prevent the conclusion that it confers jurisdiction, stating:
Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the
power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any
other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to
other law ....

[42 U.S.C. § 7192(b)] thus controls judicial review. It provides that the

district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising exclusively under
the Act without special provision for appeal to TECA. That "omission" is decisive on the
question of this Court's jurisdiction. This Court may act only where it has express authority to do so.
Texaco, 616 F.2d at 1196.
83. Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 ofthe Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory"
JudicialReview of FederalAdministrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308, 330 (1967).
84. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrative Action: The Need for Statutory
Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MIcH. L.
REV. 389, 432 (1970).
85. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
86. Pub. L. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976).
87. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. at 105.
88. Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1986

13

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 22 [1986], Iss. 4, Art. 7
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:601

grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or
impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.8 9
Califano indicated that the jurisdictional language of the APA was not
intended to confer jurisdiction, but to evidence Congress' intention and
understanding that judicial review should be widely available to challenge the actions of federal administrative officials. 90
Califano further found that while the APA does not independently
confer jurisdiction over agency actions, a general review statute may confer jurisdiction. For example, the Administrative Orders Act9 1 confers
jurisdiction to the Circuit Courts of Appeals over actions of the Atomic
Energy Commission. 92 Where such a general statutory grant of jurisdiction exists, the court so endowed has jurisdiction exclusive of all other
courts.93 General review statutes may also confer jurisdiction on district
courts.94 It is particularly important to be aware of these jurisdictional
limitations as they may make relief unavailable despite a seeming compliance with all prerequisites.
IV.

THE TIMING OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: FINALITY, EXHAUSTION OF
REMEDIES, AND RIPENESS FOR REVIEW

The doctrines of finality, exhaustion of remedies, and ripeness are
examples of some of the limitations referred to previously. These doctrines are specifically designed to address whether the petitioner seeking
judicial review of an administrative action has prematurely resorted to
the courts. 95 These doctrines are a method to ensure that the time and
resources of the court are not wasted on review of hypothetical questions
and to allow an agency the sovereignty legislated to it.
A. Finality
The first of these doctrines, finality, refers to the quality of the
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
Callfano, 430 U.S. at 103-04.
Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-51 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
28 U.S.C. § 2342(4) (1982).
FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463 (1984) (holding that a district

court lacks jurisdiction over a suit challenging FCC conduct as ultra vires when the Hobbs Act
confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals).
See also Sunflower Coalition v. NRC, 534 F. Supp. 446 (D. Colo. 1982) (holding that a Court of
Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over NRC final licensing orders); Desrosiers v. NRC, 487 F.
Supp. 71 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (holding that a district court is without jurisdiction to grant plaintiff
public hearing regarding issuance of limited license as Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction).
94. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982).
95. GELLHORN & BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS, 213.14 (5th ed.
1970).
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agency action. A court normally will not intervene in non-final agency
action because non-final action does not require compliance on the petitioner's part. In FederalPower Commission v. MetropolitanEdison Co. 96
the United States Supreme Court defined finality.9 7 The Court stated:
"[Finality] thus relates to orders of a definitive character dealing with the
merits of a proceeding before the Commission and resulting from a hearing upon evidence and supported by findings appropriate to the case."98
For an agency action to be final, the action must be sufficiently definite for the petitioner to be expected to act in compliance with the
agency's determination. If the "action" were couched in vague or ambiguous terms, there would be no reason to believe the agency expected
compliance because the petitioner would not know with what he was
expected to "comply." The Metropolitan Edison court's reference to "orders", as opposed to "regulations" or "opinions" may be based on the
idea that only an order is retrospective in nature, requiring an immediate
change in conduct by particular individuals. A regulation, however, is
prospective in nature, allowing the petitioner to adjust his conduct with
sufficient notice to avoid any irreparable harm. 99

In Cities Service Gas Co. v. FederalPower Commission " the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that final agency action exist: "for the
purposes of review, when it imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes
some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process.
..

However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the concept of
o"101

finality is not easily defined and must take into account the practical effects of review. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United
States 1 2 the Court stated:
The ultimate test of reviewability is not to be found in an overrefined
technique, but in the need of the review to protect from the irreparable
injury threatened in the exceptional case by administrative rulings
which attach legal consequences to action taken in advance of other
hearings and adjudications that may follow, the results of which the
96. 304 U.S. 375 (1938).
97. Id. at 384. Eg., Papago Tribal Utility Auth. v. FERC, 628 F.2d 235, 238-39 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980).
98. Metropolitan Edison, 304 U.S. at 384.
99. Indeed, irreparable harm is a major factor in a court's determination of whether it should
intervene in non-final agency action. General Motors v. FERC, 607 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1979); see,
e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 538 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1976).
100. 255 F.2d 860 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 857 (1958).
101. Id. at 863. See also, Conway Corp. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 1264, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd,
426 U.S. 271 (1976).
102. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
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regulations purport to control."0 3

In NiagaraMohawk Power Corp. v. Federal Power Commission 104

the FPC issued an order that allowed an anticompetitive practice between two public utilities pursuant to a transmission agreement between
them. The order was issued over the objection of a newly-formed municipal electric system. 105 The court of appeals denied the municipal electric system's petition for review and stated that the FPC order was not

"final" agency action. The holding was notwithstanding that the FPC
characterized the action as an "order" and that the FPC had demon-

strated no6 intention to allow wielding of power between the public
utilities.

10

B. Ripeness
The second doctrine, ripeness, deals with the timing 9f an action.

Before judicial review of an agency's order may be obtained, the issues
must be ripe for judicial review.10 7 To determine ripeness, a court must
evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hard-

ship to the parties of withholding consideration of the issues.1 8 The
Supreme Court decision in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,109 the best
103. Id. at 425. See also Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62 (1970); Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956); National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 677 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982); Getty Oil Co. v. Andrus, 607 F.2d 253
(9th Cir. 1979); Conway Corp. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 1264, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd, 426 U.S. 271
(1976).
104. 538 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1976).

105. Id. at 967.
106. Id. at 970-71.
107. Placid Oil Co. v. FERC, 666 F.2d 976, 981 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 673 F.2d 1322 (1982).
The doctrine of ripeness is tied to finality because ripeness can not exist without finality. Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). However, an action is not ripe simply because it is
final. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U.S. 167 (1967) (This was a companion case to
Abbott Laboratories.) Section 704 of the APA requires that actions of an agency be final in order to
be subject to judicial review. National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443
F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982), provides:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural,
or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable subject to review on the
review of the final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency
action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been
presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsiderations, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
Ripeness may also be a constitutional limitation, (Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)), by virtue
of the requirement that federal courts may only hear "cases and controversies, (U.S. CONsT. art. III,
§ 2), and an agency action prematurely reviewed may not yet qualify as a controversy.
108. PlacidOil Co., 666 F.2d at 981 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149
(1967)).
109. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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known case addressing the ripeness doctrine, stated that in order for an
agency action to be "ripe" it must first be "final,"' and that finality is to
be construed in a "pragmatic way"."'
Even though the agency itself characterizes its action as "final" a
court will still look to the practical consequences of the action to determine finality.' 12 In Pennzoilv. FERC" 3 the court of appeals enumerated
four criteria to aid in making this evaluation:
(1) Whether the issues presented are purely legal; (2) Whether the
challenged agency action constitutes "final agency action," within the
meaning of the [APA]; (3) Whether the challenged agency action has
or will have a direct and immediate impact upon the petitioners; and
impede,
(4) Whether resolution of the issues will foster, rather than
4
effective enforcement and administration by the agency.1
In Louisianav. DOE,"' a United States District Court held that all
criteria existed in a case involving the definition of
four of the above
"properties"'1 6 to be used in a two-tier crude oil pricing system." 7 The
petitioner brought an action against DOE seeking a declaration that the
reservoir-wide producing units which petitioners had established were
separate "properties" for the purpose of federal oil and gas pricing regulations. The court found that petitioner's claim involved two purely legal
issues: "(i) Whether DOE's interpretation [of 'property'] is valid; and, (ii)
if DOE's interpretation is valid, whether it is the only reasonable interpretation and thereby entitled to retroactive application."" ' Regarding
the element of finality, the court found that the issuance of rules was
determinative because the issuance of rules caused injury to Louisiana
and because DOE had shown that it intended no further proceedings." 9
As to whether a direct and immediate harm to petitioner was present; the
110. Id at 149.
I1l. Id., (citing, Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942)).
112. Carter/Mondale Presidential Comm., Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 711 F.2d 279
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
113. 645 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FEA, 435 F. Supp. 1239 (D.
Del. 1977).
114. 645 F.2d at 398.
115. 507 F. Supp. 1365 (W.D. La. 1981), aff'd, 690 F.2d 180 (1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1069
(1983). For a case involving the same factual circumstances brought by an aggrieved oil producer
see Texaco, Inc. v. DOE, 490 F. Supp. 874 (D. Del. 1980).
116. This issue was whether a property interest arose from a leasehold or fee estate.
117. "The two-tier system was designed to achieve two goals simultaneously. It was to
control inflation by limiting the price of oil then being produced to an established 'ceiling
price.' At the same time, it would stimulate increased production by allowing newly discovered crude oil to be sold at a higher free-market price." Louisiana, 507 F. Supp. at
1367.
118. Id. at 1372.

119. Id.
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petitioner alleged that it was presently receiving reduced oil royalties because of DOE's interpretation of the word "property."' 120 Finally, the
court stated that litigation of the controversy would expedite final resolu12 1
tion of the matter.
Conversely, in Diversified Chemicals and Propellants Co. v. Federal
Energy Administration12 2 the court held that the test originated in Abbott and followed by Pennzoil was not satisfied. In Diversified Chemicals,
a distributor and marketer of chemical hydrocarbon propellants used in
aerosol cans asked the Federal Energy Administration, (FEA), for an
interpretation of an FEA notice that had informed the petitioner that
petitioner's product might be covered by FEA price regulations under
the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act.' 2 3 The FEA subsequently issued an interpretation stating petitioner's product was covered by provisions of the Act.1 24 After petitioner appealed to the agency, the FEA
dismissed the petition because of petitioner's failure to notify its customers of the appeal as was required by FEA regulations. 2 After FEA
26
issued a notice of probable violation, petitioner sought judicial review.1
By relying on Abbott and by determining that the matter was not
ripe for review, the court conceded that the issue was purely legalwhether petitioner's product is covered by pricing regulations-but
stated that that issue was not conclusive. 127 The court went on to state
that a pragmatic reading of the finality requirement does not negate entirely the need for final agency action.'2 8 The FEA had not yet issued
any type of order. Thus, compliance was not yet expected. As to the
issue of whether the withholding of review would cause petitioner to suffer an unreasonable hardship, the court stated that "[u]ntil the FEA
seeks to enforce an order, the plaintiff is not subject to the possibility of
actual pecuniary liability." 129 Furthermore, "prior to enforcement of an
order, an order would first have to be issued, ..
and the issuance would
be subject to appeal." 13 0
120. Id. at 1373.
121. Id. at 1374.
122. 432 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ill.
1977), aff'd 710 F.2d 814 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 751 (1982).
124. 432 F. Supp. at 860.
125. 10 C.F.R. § 205.104(a) (1986).
126. 432 F. Supp. at 861.
127. Id. at 863.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 863-64.
130. Id. at 864 n.1. See also Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Costle, 580 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir.
1978) for the prospect that in the absence of hardship, only a minimum showing of countervailing
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Louisiana may also be distinguished from Diversified Chemicals on
the basis of formality or lack thereof. As the Abbott decision implies, the
degree of formality of the administrative action may be important in determining whether the issue is ripe for review.131 In Louisiana the FEA
issued a ruling published in the Federal Register x32 after first issuing notice. The FEA then issued another published ruling. 3 ' DOE later initiated administrative enforcement proceedings against the oil producers. 3
By contrast, in Diversified Chemicals the FEA had merely issued an interpretation upon petitioner's request and a subsequent notice of probable violation.1"'
C. Exhaustion of Remedies
The last doctrine to be considered also deals with the basic question
of timing. Generally, one is not entitled to judicial relief until a prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.1 36 Exhaustion of remedies means that a party must seek all available remedies within the
agency before the courts will review the dispute.137 Exhaustion of remedies is required for the same reason finality and ripeness are required-to
keep courts from disrupting agency proceedings.1 3 The doctrines' purpose is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its
and
special competence-to make a factual record, to apply its expertise,
13 9
controversies.
judicial
moot
to
as
so
errors
own
its
to correct
Exhaustion differs from finality in that exhaustion refers to the steps
which the litigant must take, whereas finality refers to the conclusion of
activity by the agency.14° As the case of FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of
Calif points out, a party may take all the measures available to it in the
administrative process to obtain relief, and yet not obtain a final reviewjudicial review of an administrative decision; Helco Products Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C.
Cir. 1943) (ruling that informal interpretations are not final action).
131. Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 136.
132. 42 Fed. Reg. 3628 (Jan. 19, 1977).
133. 42 Fed. Reg. 4409 (Jan. 25, 1977).
134. Louisiana v. DOE, 507 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 (W.D. La. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069.
135. Diversified Chemicals v. FEA, 432 F. Supp. 859, 860 (N.D. Ill. 1977). See also International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954) (holding that notwithstanding demonstrated hardship, an issue was not ripe for review due to the informality of the agency's action).
136. Coalition for Safe Nuclear Power v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 463 F.2d 954

(D.C. Cir. 1972).
137. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 49 (1938).

138. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
139. SEC v. G.C. George See., Inc., 637 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1981).
140. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 669 F.2d 903, 908 (3d Cir. 1982).
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able order. 14 1 Conversely, an agency order may be final for purposes of
judicial review, even though the party has not fully pursued administrative remedies.
Although the doctrines of exhaustion and ripeness are similar, 142 exhaustion may not be required to obtain ripeness where the agency is
"plainly" acting beyond its jurisdiction, 143 where the agency remedy is
inadequate, 1" where the pursuit of intra-agency remedies would be futile,1 45 or where other exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion exist
within the courts discretion. 146 For example, in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
DOE,4 7 the court of appeals sustained a district court injunction prohibiting further destruction of discovery material and compelling DOE to
preserve in one location all documents arguably related to the crude cluster proceedings.' 48 DOE audited petitioner and petitioner was then informed that it had violated the DOE regulations which controlled the
price of crude oil.149 Subsequently, certain of DOE's records pertinent to
its audit of petitioner were destroyed.' 5 The court held that the district
court properly intervened even though DOE proceedings were on-going
and were not expected to end for five years. The court stated that a delay
in full discovery rights for such a time period would "irreparably impair"
petitioners' attempt to develop their major defense.'
V.

RELIEF PENDING REVIEW

The APA provides for stays of execution of agency action pending
judicial review. Section 705 states:
When an agency finds that justice so requires, it may postpone the
141. 449 U.S. 232 (1980).
142. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FEA, 435 F. Supp. 1239, 1248 (D. Del. 1977).
143. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 430 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 562 F.2d 170 (1977). However, the claim that an agency is acting beyond the scope of its statutory jurisdiction is not enough to

overcome the exhaustion doctrine if demonstrating this depends on how the jurisdictional aspects of
the statute are applied to the facts. Myers, 303 U.S. at 51.
144. Texaco v. DOE, 490 F. Supp. 874 (D. Del. 1980).
145. Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE, 520 F. Supp. 420 (N.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 659 F.2d
150 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FEA, 435 F. Supp. 1239
(D. Del. 1977).
146. Layton & Fine, The Draft and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 56 GEo. L.J. 315,
320 (1967).
147. 663 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Accord Pennzoil Co. v. DOE, 466 F. Supp. 238 (D. Del.
1979).
148. GulfOil, 663 F.2d at 304.
149. Id. at 298.
150. Id.at 299-302.
151. Id. at 307. However, the court of appeals held that subsequent unrelated events mooted the
lower court's intervention.
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effective date of action taken by it, pending judicial review. In such
conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent

irreparable injury, the reviewing court... may issue all necessary and
appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action
or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review
proceedings. 15 2

Thus, under the APA either the agency itself or a reviewing court may
delay the effective date of an agency's action pending the outcome of
judicial review. The exhaustion doctrine does not allow such delay"'
absent a prudential or constitutional exception. 54
Courts have developed a four-part test to determine whether to
grant a stay and interim relief from agency action. The petitioner must
show (1) that he will suffer irreparable injury, 55 (2) that he will probably
prevail on the merits if agency proceedings are not stayed, 56 (3) that it is
in the public's interest that a stay and interim relief be granted, 5 7 and (4)
that a stay will not substantially harm the opposing party if the opposing
party ultimately prevails.1 5 Under this four part test, the petitioner
bears the burden of proof.1 5 9
VI.

STANDING To SEEK REVIEW

The doctrine of standing has its roots in both the United States Constitution1 60 and common law. The Constitution limits the power of federal courts to "cases" and "controversies."' 16 ' At common law, a person

seeking review of agency action had to demonstrate the invasion or
threat of invasion of a private, substantive legally protected interest aris-

ing from case law or statute.' 62 A personal or economic interest was
152. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (1982).
153. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 78 (1974).
154. See infra notes 159-166 and accompanying text.
155. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), Hamlin Testing Laboratories,
Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 337 F.2d 221, 222 (6th Cir. 1964). The District of
Columbia circuit court has aptly stated that "what constitutes irreparable injury in one instance may
not constitute such under different circumstances." Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 295
F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
156. Permian,390 U.S. at 747. See also Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 729,
729-30 (5th Cir. 1979).
157. Permian, 390 U.S. at 748.
158. Unglesby v. Zimny, 250 F. Supp. 714, 716 (W.D. Cal. 1965).
159. See Coming Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 562 F. Supp. 279,
282 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (cited for the proposition that the test applied for an application of a stay is
same as that for a preliminary injunction, placing burden of proof on movant).
160. U. S. CONST., art. III § 2.
161. Id.
162. Associated Indus. of New York State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd 64
S.Ct. 74 (1943).
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insufficient. 163 In essence, the agency must have caused some wrong that
would have given the plaintiff a legal cause of action, had the agency
been an individual.
Eventually, the growth of the federal bureaucracy 164 led to a liberalizing trend in the doctrine of standing. The trend received legitimacy
with the decision of FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,165 which held
that the term "aggrieved person" was not limited to one suffering an
individual wrong.1 66 The trend received further legitimacy with the
adoption of the APA a short time later, 167 especially by the adoption of
section 702.168
Standing is determined by a much different test today than at common law. The prerequisites for standing to sue are: (1) "There must be
injury in fact to the Plaintiff, economic or otherwise; and (2) The interest
sought to be protected by the Plaintiff must arguably be within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute involved." 1 9 If
the plaintiff meets these two requirements, then the plaintiff is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of section 702 of the APA 70
An example of the modem liberalizing trend in the standing doctrine is the case of American Horse Protection Association Inc. v. Frizzell.171 In that case, the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada described the "injury in fact" element of the standing requirement thusly:
[The injury in fact] requirement can be met by alleging that the members of some group suffer an actual injury by the agency action; the
injury can be aesthetic or environmental values. The crucial factor is
whether plaintiff alleges an actual injury in fact; the Court should find
that standing exists where such an injury is alleged, despite an attenuated line of causation from the agency action to the injury and whether
163. Alabama Power v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1938).
164. See Hasl, Standing Revisited-The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 12

(1973), for a discussion of bureaucratic growth.
165. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). See also Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
166. Sanders Bros. Radio, 309 U.S. at 476-77.
167. The APA was adopted in 1942, two years after Sanders.
168. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
169. Nuclear Data, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 344 F. Supp. 719, 724 (N.D. Il. 1972)
(quoting Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also Safir
v. Kreps, 551 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 820 (1977); Caulfield v. Board of Educ. of
New York, 449 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); City and County of San Francisco v. United States,
443 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
170. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
171. 403 F. Supp. 1206 (D. Nev. 1975). But see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)
(holding that standing will not be allowed where nothing more than a "longstanding interest" is
alleged). Id.
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to prove ultimately that he has in fact sufor not plaintiff will be able
1 72
fered the alleged injury.

Energy-related cases have followed the liberalized trend of standing.
173
In Northern States Power Co. v. Rural ElectrificationAdministration,
the court allowed standing to two privately-owned power companies
which objected to REA's grant of a loan to an electric cooperative. The
companies alleged that the electric cooperative would use the proceeds to
duplicate some of the services of the power companies, thus causing economic harm to REA.17 4 Under the common law analysis, the petitioners
would not have had standing because loans between two individuals are
not illegal, despite economic harm to a third person. However, under
modem analysis the result is contrary. Mere economic injury, if caused
by "unlawful" competition 7 5 which is the the result of agency action, is
sufficient to satisfy the "injury in fact" element of standing. 176 In Arkla
Exploration Co. v. Watt, 7 7 Arkla objected to the government's granting
of an application of another exploration company for oil and gas leases
on military lands.1 78 The United States District Court for the Western
District of Arkansas allowed the petitioner standing even though the petitioner had not alleged that it would have been successful, had it been
allowed to bid competitively with the other exploration companies. 7 9
Even if all the aforementioned obstacles to judicial review are satisfied, courts will not entertain a request for relief if the request falls
outside the boundaries of judicial province. These boundaries are defined
under the scope of the judicial review doctrine.
VII.

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

If judicial review is available, the scope of review will be limited
depending on whether the controverted issue is one of fact or one of
law.18 0 With respect to questions of fact, the prevailing view is that a
172. American Horse ProtectionAss'n, 403 F. Supp. at 1214.
173. 248 F. Supp. 616 (D. Minn. 1965).
174. Id. at 624.
175. The Northern States Power Co. court did not define "unlawful competition," but it did
imply that competition which would not have occurred but for the REA violation of its own order is
unlawful competition.
176. Northern States Power Co., 248 F. Supp. at 624.
177. 548 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Ark. 1982). This court gives a very complete and relatively lengthy
discussion of the present doctrine of standing.
178. Id. at 468.
179. Id. at 471.
180. General Ry. Signal Co. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 527 F. Supp. 359, 360
(D.D.C. 1979), aff'd, 664 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981).
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court will not set aside an agency finding of fact as long as such a finding
is supported by "substantial evidence." 18 ' Rule 706 of the APA 8 2 calls
for a "substantial evidence" rule in formal agency actions and when a
statute otherwise requires review on the record. 183 This "substantial evidence" rule is similar to the scope of review available to appellate court
review of jury determinations. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.184 Further, the evidence must be enough to justify a refusal to
grant a directed verdict.185 Moreover, the substantial evidence rule does
not involve weighing the evidence. Further the possibility of drawing
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. 18 6
In Distrigas of Massachusetts Corp. v. FERC,117 the First Circuit stated
that as long as FERC's argument on a natural gas rate issue was logical,
consistent with traditional rate-making principles, supported by substantial evidence on the record, and not otherwise arbitrary, the court must
uphold the result. 88
By sharp contrast, when the issue is one of law there is no presumption of finality as is given to issues of fact. The court may decide the issue
itself. 89 This makes sense in light of the expertise of the court in resolv-

ing questions of law and the fact that an agency's own factual determinations may be based on its particular expertise1 90 in its area of regulatory
responsibility.' 91 Once again, under section 706 of the APA 192 only formal actions are involved.193 An administrative determination of a question of law does not have a presumption of correctness. Although it
181. Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 283 (1974).
182. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).

183. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982).
184. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

185. United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 528 F. Supp. 728, 732 (E.D. Okla. 1978), aff'd, 611
F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1979).
186. Ward v. Harris, 515 F. Supp. 859, 862 (W.D. Okla. 1981); June Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Andrus, 506 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (D. Colo. 1981), aff'd, 717 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1983).
187. 737 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1984).
188. Id. at 1215. See also Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).

189. General Ry. Signal Co. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 527 F. Supp. 359
(D.D.C. 1979), aff'd, 664 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981).

190. United States ex reL Chapman v. FPC, 191 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1951).
191. Lugo v. Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
192. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
193. Informal actions are discussed infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
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might be entitled to some weight, it is not conclusive.' 94 Therefore, the
decision by the Secretary of the Interior in Brennan v. Udall195 was reviewable. The Secretary held that certain homesteaders' reservation of
oil rights to the United States included oil shale adversely affected by the
successors to the homesteaders' title to land. 196
The above analysis dealt with formal agency action under the auspices of the APA. Informal agency action is subject to an "arbitrary and
capricious" test.' 97 In Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE' 95 the court stated:
The standard of review of agency action alleged to be arbitrary and
capricious is not simply whether there exists a rational basis for the
action. Rather... the inquiry is whether the decision was based on a
consideration of relevant factors, whether there has been clear error of
judgment and whether there is a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.'

99

As the Mobil Oil court makes clear, the standard of review to informal
agency action is highly deferential and presumes the validity of agency
action. 2°
VIII.

CONCLUSION

If all of the above elements are surmounted, the court may review
the agency action in controversy. Of course an aggrieved person must
seek out every possible intra-agency remedy before attempting judicial
review. This makes sense because even if judicial review is obtained, it is
a mere starting point, subject to a determination on the merits and to the
appeal process just as any ordinary judicial determination would be. In a
cost/benefit analysis, judicial review would not be feasible unless the benefits of seeking judicial review far outweigh the costs of complying with
the agency action. Thus, a person seeking judicial review will almost
always be a person capable both of losing a great deal in complying with
194. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Shea, 276 F. Supp. 610, 612 (S.D. Tex. 1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d 521
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
195. 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967).
196. Id. at 805.
197. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
198. 610 F.2d 796 (Temp. Emer. App. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980).
199. Id. at 801. See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
For a discussion asserting that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard should not stand in the
way of pragmatic considerations see, Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden ofProofandScope ofReview,
79 HARV. L. Rav. 914 (1966).
200. Motor Vehicles Mfgs. Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 719 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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agency action and of sustaining the long and costly process that litigation
entails.
RichardL. Hughes
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